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Abstract
Fear appeals are used in many domains. Cybersecurity researchers are also starting to experiment with fear appeals, many 
reporting positive outcomes. Yet there are ethical concerns related to the use of fear to motivate action. In this paper, we 
explore this aspect from the perspectives of cybersecurity fear appeal deployers and recipients. We commenced our investiga-
tion by considering fear appeals from three foundational ethical perspectives. We then consulted the two stakeholder groups to 
gain insights into the ethical concerns they consider to be pertinent. We first consulted deployers: (a) fear appeal researchers 
and (b) Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), and then potential cybersecurity fear appeal recipients: members of a 
crowdsourcing platform. We used their responses to develop an effects-reasoning matrix, identifying the potential benefits 
and detriments of cybersecurity fear appeals for all stakeholders. Using these insights, we derived six ethical principles to 
guide cybersecurity fear appeal deployment. We then evaluated a snapshot of cybersecurity studies using the ethical princi-
ple lens. Our contribution is, first, a list of potential detriments that could result from the deployment of cybersecurity fear 
appeals and second, the set of six ethical principles to inform the deployment of such appeals. Both of these are intended to 
inform cybersecurity fear appeal design and deployment.
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Introduction
Fear is defined by Walton (2010, p. 178), as an emotion that 
moves people powerfully to action, and may tend to make 
them put more careful considerations of the complex features 
of a situation aside. A fear appeal usually packages some 
fear “trigger”, together with an action that the fear appeal 
designer wants the recipient to take. The consequence, so 
the theory goes, is that the fear appeal recipient will seek 
to reduce the negative emotion by taking the recommended 
action (Frijda et al. 1989).
Fear appeals have spread from use in religion (Ragsdale 
and Durham 1986) (centuries) to a variety of other domains, 
including smoking (Hamilton et al. 2000), nuclear radiation 
(Dillard 1994), alcohol abuse (Stainback and Rogers 1983) 
and, recently, cybersecurity1 (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; 
Johnston et al. 2015; Vance et al. 2013).
Fear appeals are delivered via a variety of channels 
including, for example, on cigarette packets, in health prac-
titioners’ waiting rooms and via a computer’s user interface 
(Fig. 12).
While many advocate the use of fear appeals (Johnston 
and Warkentin 2010; Johnston et al. 2015; Vance et al. 2013; 
Beck 1984; Stainback and Rogers 1983; Tannenbaum et al. 
2015), others argue that fear appeals are actually ill-advised, 
harmful, or ineffective (Albarracín et al. 2005; Brennan and 
Binney 2010; Kok et al. 2018; Kohn et al. 1982; Krisher 
et al. 1973; Lau et al. 2016; Hastings et al. 2004) and oth-
ers warn against the use of fear in behavioral interventions 
(Brennan and Binney 2010; Lewis et al. 2008; O’Neill and 
Nicholson-Cole 2009), with a number citing ethical con-
cerns (Tengland 2012; Hastings et al. 2004; Hyman and 
Tansey 1990). Given the differences of opinion, it seems 
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appropriate to contemplate the ethical implications of cyber-
security fear appeals. As depicted in Fig. 2, the paper is 
structured as follows:
In Phase 1, we commence by explaining what a fear 
appeal is, detail its constituent parts (FAi) and introduce 
three different ethical theories, which provide a useful lens 
in considering the ethics of fear appeals (section “Phase 1: 
Theory”).
In Phase 2, we detail the methods and materials used in 
our study (section “Phase 2: Material and methods”). Next, 
we report on the insights gained from interviews we carried 
out with fear appeal researchers, a survey with company 
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and members 
of the public, in order to identify their perceptions of the 
potential detriments of fear appeal deployment—PDi (sec-
tion “Phase 2: Results”). We chose to interview these par-
ticular stakeholders because researchers carry out research 
to test the efficacy and design features of fear appeals. Their 
findings are likely to feed into the use of cybersecurity fear 
appeals by CISOs within their organizations to encourage 
secure behaviors. We also surveyed members of the public, 
as the main targets of such cybersecurity fear appeals, to 
ensure that we gauged perceptions from both deployers and 
their target audience.
The selection of these stakeholders was designed to be 
complementary to one another since the questions we asked 
and the perspectives they represented are all quite different 
from one another. Thus, the goal was breadth of perspective 
rather than depth with a singular focus. We do not suggest 
that the perspectives and insight gleaned from these stake-
holders is generalizable to other types of stakeholders or 
similar stakeholders of the same type. Instead, our focus 
was to better understand some of the concerns and opinions 
related to the use of fear appeals from a diverse group of 
stakeholder types in a complementary manner.
We analyzed the outcomes of the interviews and surveys 
to extract benefits and potential detriments (PDi) of cyber-
security fear appeal deployment. We developed an Effects-
Reasoning Matrix (ERM), a mechanism proposed by Duke 
et al. (1993), to evaluate and depict the benefits and potential 
detriments of cybersecurity fear appeals (Duke et al. 1993). 
Duke et al.explain that this matrix is intended to aid in iso-
lating and identifying conflicts that may arise when fear 
appeals are considered from a variety of ethical perspec-
tives involving many interested publics [p. 120].
In Phase 3, we build on the insights we gained during 
phase 2 to derive six ethical principles to inform the deploy-
ment of cybersecurity fear appeals—Ei (section “Phase 3: 
Deriving ethical principles (Ei)”). These build on the fear 
appeal components (FAi) enumerated in section  “Fear 
appeals (FAi)”, the ethical insights from section “Ethical 
theories”, and the potential detriments that emerged from 
phase 2 (PDi).
Application: We subsequently used the ethical principle 
lens to review a representative sample of cybersecurity fear 
appeal studies.
Fig. 1  Fear appeal examples (cigarettes, contagious disease and poor password choice)
Fig. 2  The phases involved in 
this research
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Finally: We consolidate our insights to reflect on the 
ethics of cybersecurity fear appeals and the limitations of 




The essential components of fear appeals (FAi) are as fol-
lows, ordered as recommended by Dillard et al. (2017), Lev-
enthal (1970). 
FA1  Information about the importance of a threat (trig-
gering fear (Leventhal 1970)) and the cause. Also 
details about the consequence of the threat, empha-
sizing the severity thereof (Tannenbaum et al. 2015; 
Rogers and Mewborn 1976; De Hoog et al. 2007) e.g. 
“you could lose all your personal photos.”
FA2  Explaining that the recommended action has 
response efficacy (action will be effective in mitigat-
ing the threat (Dillard et al. 2017; Lewis et al. 2008; 
Tunner et al. 1989)) e.g.“ making regular backups 
ensure that your photos will always be there for you.”
FA3  Exact details related to feasible recommended 
actions to be taken to reduce or remove the threat 
(how to assuage the fear (Leventhal 1970; Witte 
1992; Lawson et al. 2016)) e.g. “register for a cloud 
backup service and set up auto-backup on your 
devices, as follows...”
FA4  A statement related to their ability to take the action: 
self-efficacy (the individual’s belief in being able 
to take the action (Dillard et al. 2017; Dabbs and 
Leventhal 1966; Hamilton et al. 2000; Emery et al. 
2014; Bandura 2001; Hartmann et al. 2014; Peters 
et al. 2013; Bandura 1977)) e.g. “98% of people using 
this backup service rate it as extremely easy to use.” 
Dillard et al.explain that people will take desirable 
actions if they are able to do so (Dillard 1994), mak-
ing perceived self efficacy essential.
Fear appeal theories
Theories that explain how fear engenders behavioral change 
include: (1) Fear as Drive (Hovland et al. 1953), (2) Par-
allel Response Model (Leventhal 1970), considering that 
fear triggers two independent processes: fear control and 
danger control. The next two theories elaborate this ini-
tial model: Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers 
1975), and (4) Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte 
1992). These all incorporate some notion of fear being trig-
gered, leading to an appraisal of the threat and the efficacy 
of the recommended action as a response. The recipient also 
considers their own competence in terms of carrying out 
the recommended action. These theories explain how fear 
appeals influence behavior but are not intended to address 
the ethical considerations of their deployment. As such, they 
cannot answer our primary research questions.
Fear appeal efficacy
Cybersecurity fear appeals have been used with varying 
measures of success, either to persuade people to cease or 
reduce ill-advised behaviors, or to commence secure behav-
iors (Beck 1984; Stainback and Rogers 1983; Tannenbaum 
et al. 2015).
Yet there are those who consider fear appeals ill-advised 
(Arthur and Quester 2003; Brennan and Binney 2010; Kok 
et al. 2018; Kohn et al. 1982; Krisher et al. 1973; Lau et al. 
2016). Kok et al. (2018) deplores the general “false belief” 
in fear appeals. French et al. (2017) find little evidence that 
risk information impacts health behaviors. Peters et  al. 
(2014) call fear “a bad counselor”. These concerns come 
from researchers and practitioners working in other domains 
but need also to be considered in the cybersecurity domain 
(Renaud and Dupuis 2019).
Whenever this kind of dissent manifests around the use 
of a particular behavioral intervention, we can turn to ethi-
cal theories to help us to decide whether to proceed with its 
deployment, or not.
Ethical theories
Cavanagh et al. (1981) argue for consideration of three kinds 
of moral theories in contemplating the ethics of a proposed 
action: (1) theory of rights, (2) utilitarian and (3) theories 
of justice.
(1) The theory of rights is argued by Kant, whose three 
principles of morality are encapsulated in his “categori-
cal imperative” (Reynolds and Bowie 2004; Duke et al. 
1993): 
 i. The Golden Rule only do to others what you 
would like others to do to you.
 ii. Respect for Humanity humans should not be 
used as means to an end; humans have basic 
human rights and are an end in themselves;
 iii. Universality the action should be universally 
acceptable to all human beings.
(2) Utilitarian theories (Mill and Utilitarianism 1863) 
argue that the benefits obtained from an action, such 
as a positive change in behavior, outweigh the costs.
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(3) Theories of justice are linked to public reasoning, the 
idea that there are rules which reasonable agents would 
agree to be subject to Rawls (2005). Wrapped up in 
Rawls’ conceptualization of justice is that everyone in 
society ought to consider that they are being treated 
fairly by an intervention.
We can now consider fear appeals under the umbrella of 
each of these three ethical theories:
Cybersecurity fear appeals under Kant
Kant’s categorical imperative is: Act only according to that 
rule whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should 
become a universal law. (Thompson 2012, p. 629). This 
approach mandates respect for the autonomy of decision 
makers. There is also an absolute requirement for recipients 
to be given requisite knowledge about the risks and to be 
allowed to consent to receive the risk communication.
The goal of fear appeals is to derive positive behavio-
ral outcomes. Those results naturally frame the use of fear 
appeals. There is clearly an important role for the users of 
systems to behave in such a way as to minimize cybersecu-
rity risks. However, Kantian ethics is concerned with the act 
itself (Micewski and Troy 2007) and, as such, is not inher-
ently concerned with, or otherwise focused on, the possible 
outcome of the act. Basically, the argument is that people 
should not be manipulated in order to achieve some other 
end, such as a desired behavior. Indeed, one of Kant’s argu-
ments is that people should never be treated as a means to an 
end, in this case better cybersecurity for society.
There are a number of arguments opposing the use of 
fear under Kantian ethics. For example, Bayer and Fairch-
ild (2016) consider fear appeals to be inherently paternal-
istic, disempowering the recipient, and compromising their 
agency and autonomy. This is similar to the increased role 
of technology in our lives (Royakkers et al. 2018). Inducing 
fear in individuals may result in unsafe levels of anxiety and 
tension for some, especially among those that already have 
a mental health condition (Hastings et al. 2004; Hyman and 
Tansey 1990) or are of a particular age (Benet et al. 1993). 
We could ask whether the mere possibility of encouraging 
a target behavior serves a greater good than the very prob-
able outcome of one or more individuals experiencing real 
psychological harm, especially when the fear arousal is par-
ticularly high. Considering the greater perceived efficacy of 
high-level fear appeals compared with low-level fear appeals 
(Emery et al. 2014; Hartmann et al. 2014), this suggests 
that the former is more likely to be used. However, it is also 
these high-level fear appeals that are most likely to cause 
psychological harm (Berelson and Steiner 1964; Chen 2016; 
Janis and Feshbach 1953). Those who disapprove of the use 
of fear appeals may consider that cybersecurity education, 
training, and awareness programs should be used to improve 
outcomes but that these should not be used within a fear 
appeal.
There are also arguments against applying Kantian eth-
ics to cybersecurity fear appeals. It may be argued that the 
categorical imperative is inherently subjectively applied. As 
such, it is entirely possible for one person to approve of the 
use of fear appeals, and their becoming a universal way of 
motivating action. Another person may consider them abhor-
rent. We next consider the Utilitarian perspective.
Cybersecurity fear appeals under utilitarianism
Utilitarian ethics provides a contrasting viewpoint on behav-
ior, intent, and outcome (West 2004). The mantra here is: 
Do that which produces the greatest good for the greatest 
number of affected parties. (Thompson 2012, p. 629). The 
outcome of an action is what is important in utilitarianism; 
it is a type of consequentialism ethics (Buchanan and Ess 
2008). The central question of whether an action is ethical 
or not rests on whether it improves happiness or decreases 
unhappiness, for the populace as a whole.
For a utilitarian, risk communication should focus on 
achieving desired outcomes. Facilitating a detailed under-
standing of the risks is not required (Thompson 2012). If a 
positive outcome is achieved as measured by its effect on the 
populace as a whole, then how this was achieved is of little 
concern so long as these benefits outweigh the costs.
Utilitarian ethics is the ethical framework that guides 
human subjects research in the United States (Capurro and 
Pingel 2002) and is even codified in law (Buchanan and Ess 
2008). According to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 
Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated 
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowl-
edge that may reasonably be expected to result (32 CFR Ch. 
I, Section 219.111(a)(2)). The possible benefits to a research 
participant are not mandatory; instead, the law looks at the 
big picture. If the benefits do not outweigh the costs associ-
ated with its derivation for a participant in a study, then it is 
acceptable, so long as the knowledge gained does.
Cybersecurity research is often focused on how an organi-
zation or the Internet community as a whole may be made 
safer by conducting research on the individual (e.g., Ander-
son and Agarwal 2010), rather than merely by how a particu-
lar individual can engage in safer online behavior for herself. 
Both foci are important, but the result may be such that there 
is little, if any, discernible benefit for a single individual 
participating in a cybersecurity fear appeal study, at least in 
the short-term. The greater hope is that any costs incurred 
by the participant, whether psychological or otherwise, are 
far outweighed by the potential benefits to a much larger 
audience. In this respect, cybersecurity fear appeal research 
generally operates from a utilitarian ethics framework.
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Cybersecurity fear appeals under justice theory
The mantra here is that any intervention should be fair, and 
accepted as such by the population as a whole. For exam-
ple, the prohibition of alcohol in the USA was initially sup-
ported by citizens (Graham 2019) but became increasingly 
unpopular due to dissatisfaction with the stringent activities 
the state used to enforce prohibition (Cowan 1986). The act 
was eventually repealed, even though there is evidence that 
prohibition did indeed reduce rates of liver cirrhosis and 
infant mortality (Moore 1989).
In the realms of fear appeals there is also concern from a 
justice perspective. Furedi (2018) warn that the creation of 
a culture of fear could be corrosive to society, leading to a 
general level of mistrust. Arthur and Quester (2003) carried 
out a study to compare different kinds of fear appeals and 
found that participants found social threat type fear appeals 
the most unethical.
One ethical dilemma is the demonization that may occur 
when specific subgroups are targeted with a fear appeal. This 
occurred during the height of the AIDS crisis during which 
fear appeal messages led people to further stigmatize and 
demonize gay individuals (Wojciechowski and Babjaková 
2015). The very group the message is intended to help the 
most may actually be harmed through this demonization. 
Furedi (2018) argues that people can start to see risk avoid-
ance, which is what fear appeals try to achieve, as a moral 
duty. This means that those who refuse to succumb to fear 
appeals could end up being marginalized by society.
Perhaps equally as troubling, this demonization may lead 
to complacency among those that are not within the sub-
group (Hastings et al. 2004). When the focus is on one par-
ticular subgroup, it means other subgroups may feel as if the 
message does not apply to them. While it may make sense 
to target the higher-risk subgroups, it may ultimately send 
the wrong message. For example, campaigns targeting sexu-
ally transmitted infections have often focused on subgroups 
considered more sexually active (e.g., younger individuals) 
and those likely to engage in unsafe sexual practices, such as 
not using a condom. This has arguably resulted in increased 
rates of sexually transmitted infections among older adults 
(Minichiello et al. 2012). After all, they may feel that if they 
were at risk then the messaging would target them as well.
Given that fear appeals are often used to elicit a change 
in behavior from a group of people that are at some risk 
based on their current behavior, it is not surprising that many 
targets of fear appeals belong to one or more inherently vul-
nerable groups. For example, fear appeals may be used to 
help elderly individuals engage in behavior that is safer for 
them (Benet et al. 1993). The intent may be worthwhile, but 
in effect we are trying to scare an already vulnerable group. 
Even if it works, is it ethical to scare any group of people 
for this desired end, let alone a group that may already be 
vulnerable? Indeed, Watney (1989) raises concerns about 
fear appeals terrorizing those that they are targeting.
In terms of fairness, it is easy to see that issues might well 
emerge with the use of fear appeals in any heterogeneous 
and diverse population.
Phase 2: Material and methods
Duke et al. (1993) suggest examining the ethics of fear 
appeals by considering the benefits and detriments to all 
stakeholders. We thus consulted two cybersecurity fear 
appeal stakeholders: (1) deployers: fear appeal researchers 
and organizational CISOs, and (2) recipients: the potential 
targets of such fear appeals. IRB approval was on file and 
informed consent was obtained in all instances.
Cybersecurity fear appeal deployer opinions
Our primary research questions were: 
RQ1  Does the deployer approve of the use of cybersecu-
rity fear appeals to motivate secure behaviors?
RQ2  Does the deployer consider cybersecurity fear 
appeals to be efficacious in motivating secure 
behaviors?
RQ3  Which ethical issues are raised about the use of 
cybersecurity fear appeals to motivate secure 
behaviors?
Recruitment: deployers
We identified a number of cybersecurity fear appeal 
researchers based on their authorship of highly-cited cyber-
security fear appeal papers. We emailed these to request 
a Skype-based interview, explaining what our study was 
about. We carried out semi-structured interviews, remotely 
via Skype, with the six researchers who agreed, asking the 
questions provided in Appendix B. All of these are located 
within the UK or the USA.
We invited CISOs to take our survey, once again rely-
ing on convenience sampling. The survey consisted of both 
quantitative and qualitative questions. Eleven CISOs repre-
senting both North American and European organizations 
completed our survey. The survey questions are provided 
in Appendix C. These participants were located primarily 
in the United States (N = 7), followed by Canada (N = 2), 
United Kingdom (N = 1), and Zimbabwe (N = 1). Partici-
pants were recruited from contact lists the researchers had 
from prior engagements, as well as requests to CISOs we 
already knew.
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Fear appeal recipient opinions
Our primary research questions were: 
RQ1  Did potential cybersecurity fear appeal recipients 
approve of the use of such fear appeals to motivate 
secure behaviors?
RQ2  How did cybersecurity fear appeals make potential 
recipients feel?
RQ3  How did potential cybersecurity fear appeal recipi-
ents feel about the ethics of such fear appeals?
Recruitment: recipients
We surveyed 400 workers on a crowdsourcing platform in 
order to assess their responses to, and feelings about, being 
targeted by cybersecurity fear appeals (Steelman et al. 2014). 
Workers were paid $1.50 for completing the survey. Atten-
tion questions were embedded in order to weed out inatten-
tive responses, with 3.4% of participants failing one or more 
of these questions. The mean and median time to complete 
the survey was 9.77 and 7.07 minutes, respectively. A large 
majority (94.2%) of participants reported that the time and 
effort to complete the survey for the compensation received 
was easier or comparable to other projects. All participants 
reported being a resident of the United States. The survey 
questions are enumerated in Appendix D.
Phase 2: Results
Analysis
The transcripts of the interviews and the survey responses 
were analyzed using thematic analysis, focusing on identi-
fying themes and patterns related to the use of fear appeals 
in cybersecurity. The authors then met to agree on the final 
codes. The final codes were then aligned with the three 
research questions. In this discussion a number of potential 
detriments will emerge, and labeled PDi for later reference.
RQ1 Findings
Researchers The researchers we interviewed were gener-
ally supportive of the use of fear appeals. Some did express 
the need for a roadmap to guide experimentation with fear 
appeals: come up with some kind of roadmap for some meth-
odology, some guidelines to ensure that when fear appeals 
are being used in the Cyber context [..] that they’re mindful 
of... to help mediate whatever is being done in the work. 
Others were happy for their ethical review boards to take 
the responsibility for ensuring that their studies did not cross 
ethical boundaries. One researcher expressed concern with 
‘fear appeal fatigue’, saying: People are getting sick of all of 
it. It’s now I’m just wondering whether we might, you know 
be confronting the same sort of situation with information 
security as well. This introduces PD9: Contributing towards 
overall fear fatigue. However, the researcher followed this 
statement with: I think people still need to see them because 
it brings back the security into the mindset and I think lots 
of it. This suggests that although they have a concern, they 
still believe that fear appeals are indicated.
CISOs The CISOs were split in terms of approving of 
the use of fear appeals in their organizations. Four consid-
ered the use of fear appeals acceptable, six were against, 
and one did not express an opinion. It is interesting to note 
that the three respondents with the most experience (15–20 
years, 21–26 years and 11–14 years) all approved of the use 
of cybersecurity fear appeals in their organizations. One 
CISO, who approved, said: Human nature is usually driven 
by fear to act in a certain way and another said: Fear is an 
excellent motivator. One disapproving CISO said: You want 
your users to be allies not subjects. Allies see they have a 
stake and a role in protecting the business, subjects avoid 
contact with those that may castigate them. Another com-
mented: Fear is known to paralyze normal decision mak-
ing and reactions. This infers a deleterious mental load is 
being subjected on the user via fear appeals. This could be 
impacting mental health. Two potential detriments emerge: 
PD1 Alienation of non-cyber employees; PD2 Paralyzing 
cybersecurity-related decision making.
Summary The researchers were mostly supportive of the 
use of cybersecurity fear appeals, which is understandable 
given their research foci. Fewer than half of the CISOs were 
supportive though.
RQ2 Findings
Researchers One researcher said: I acknowledge that certain 
people probably will respond to a fear appeal and others 
will respond to something else. So for the group that will 
respond, I think my belief is the benefits probably outweigh 
the costs. Another said: Most of us who are working this area 
[snip] believe that people should have more precautions and 
should have their shields up and be more wary and skeptical 
of phone calls and emails and everything else. We asked this 
researcher: Is there anything else you can think of that that 
might be another candidate for getting people to care?. The 
researcher answered: I don’t see it. No. This is not an over-
whelming vote of confidence, giving more of a sense that, of 
the available tools, fear seems to be the best. Yet, given the 
first part of this comment, the following potential detriment 
emerges: PD3 Succeeding with part of society, and putting 
a disproportional burden on their shoulders
CISOs When asked to rank the efficacy of all the differ-
ent kinds of techniques they deploy to address cybersecurity 
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behaviors (on a scale from 1: ineffective to 7:extremely 
effective), not a single CISO ranked scary messages as maxi-
mally efficacious. (The maximum ranking for scary mes-
sages was a 4.) This suggests that even the proponents had a 
feeling that cybersecurity fear appeals might not be the best 
way to encourage more secure behaviors. The interventions 
ranked maximally efficacious by the CISOs were: peer sup-
port (2), games (2), skill development and training (1), and 
monitoring and reporting to managers (1). The latter came 
from one of the people who did not support the use of fear 
appeals. Yet it could be argued that reporting people to their 
managers is a kind of fear-based intervention. Some CISOs 
mentioned being under pressure from auditors and concerns 
about data breaches, which led them to use fear appeals.
Summary The researchers spoke about people needing 
to take particular security actions, and reasoned that fear 
appeals motivated them to do this. The CISOs were not as 
convinced of the efficacy of fear appeals.
RQ3 Findings
Researchers All of the researchers mentioned the need to 
get IRB approval before carrying out a fear appeal study so 
that they could ensure that the researcher’s planned interven-
tion was ethical. A number of ethical concerns were men-
tioned by the researchers: the fear appeals being considered 
manipulative, not causing mental or emotional harm, get-
ting the balance right, and not scaring people unduly. One 
researcher said: so there’s always like of course you [get] 
the research benefits in terms of how accurate your research 
would be and also, on the other hand, how much risk or how 
much distress that might bring the participants and it’s just I 
guess you kind of have to find a middle ground in there. One 
researcher did not consider it unethical to lie: I would say 
when the motive is truly to improve the behaviors about what 
people are doing that it would not be a terrible ethical issue.
Another researcher, who had over-sold a particular conse-
quence in a fear appeal study, said he would not do so again, 
because of the unexpected anger and resentment this caused.
The following potential detriments emerge from this 
discussion: PD4 Risks being over inflated or untruthful, to 
maximize motivation to take cybersecurity actions. PD5 
Giving too little added security in return for experienced 
fear.
One researcher emphasized the need to include a recom-
mended action in the fear appeal: I would hope as part of 
a fear appeal study that there is some... mitigation strategy 
that you are giving them for how to address that fear
This introduces the next potential detriment: PD6 People 
being unable to take cybersecurity actions to assuage the 
triggered fear.
A number mentioned the need to debrief participants to 
respect their need to be informed of the intervention and 
the anticipated outcome: So really importantly is again 
the debriefing process at the very end and I think Internet 
research always nowadays would bring a challenge to this. 
...So I think it’s just to make sure that there is an elaborate 
debriefing process even if people drop out of an experi-
ment in the middle.
This introduces the next potential detriment: PD7 
People being treated as a means to an end, without full 
information.
Interviewees also emphasize the need for researchers to 
discuss cybersecurity fear appeal designs with each other. 
One interviewee said: ...what was actually currently being 
published in a particular domain or what other researchers 
are doing . Another mentioned mentoring his own students 
designing fear appeal studies: I know when working with 
some doc students that are designing their fear appeal stud-
ies they’re asking a lot of questions about IRB and previ-
ous experiences with IRB. Also mentioned was the value of 
discussing fear appeal designs at conferences with peers: I 
think conversations at conferences like the one we will have 
at [snip] when researchers can talk about the experiences 
they’ve had and the impact their fear appeals have had. So 
a lot of it based on my previous experiences, but I want to 
share those with other people when I can. So, conferences 
are great places to do that. They don’t really show up in the 
papers themselves.
CISOs The ethical concerns mentioned by the CISOs 
included being truthful to employees, unintended negative 
side effects that could bleed into their carrying out their 
work-related tasks, negative consequences by impacting 
the cybersecurity program over time, and potential mental 
health impacts. Some considered lying to employees unethi-
cal: You must be truthful and not spread unnecessary FUD 
(fear, uncertainty, and doubt). CISO2 highlighted the need 
to give the person some action to take: Fear is only effective 
if it is accompanied by a solution to ease that fear. Fear in 
itself will turn to indifference if not properly directed.
To illustrate the potentially negative consequences of 
fear appeals, CISO7 said, of a fear appeal his organization 
adopted: It was discontinued after the printouts [reports 
of undesirable behaviors] dwindled down to nothing, but 
the damage to the perception of Security lasted long after 
(text in square brackets added by authors). He added: ... 
also caused or added to a deep distrust and resentment in 
the security department not only by associates called out in 
the reports, but peers who thought this was the wrong way 
to handle the problem. This supports potential detriments 
PD1, PD4 & PD6 and introduces: PD8 Employees becom-
ing disgruntled.
CISO3, asked about testing efficacy of fear appeals, said: 
We never specifically measured it. Monthly security drills 
though seem to produce consistently same results. This sug-
gests that behavioral interventions are being used in some 
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organizations without any kind of calibration to confirm 
their efficacy. This supports PD1 and PD5.
Fear appeal recipients’ reactions
RQ1 findings
We asked whether our respondents approved of cybersecu-
rity fear appeals. 44.00% approved, 47.50% did not approve 
and 8.50% said it depended on a number of factors. These 
34 responses fell into a number of categories. Some said 
they would approve if they deemed its use justified. Others 
were concerned about the negative consequences of the fear 
appeal on the recipient, one pointing out that the recipient 
may not have sufficient skills to manage the risk the fear 
appeal is communicating, supporting PD6. Another said: 
Can possibly create anxiety/depression/paranoia depend-
ing on the person introducing PD10 Creating cybersecurity-
related anxiety and paranoia.
A number of respondents said that they did not approve 
of over-inflating the risk or going “over the top”. One said If 
it’s factual then yes. If it’s made up statistics to scare people, 
then no, supporting PD4.
Another response said: Use of fear grabs people’s atten-
tion and motivates them to do something but I do not care 
for it, which indicates that this particular respondent could 
see why they were used, but did not feel happy about their 
use. This supports PD7.
RQ2 findings
When offered a list of responses reflecting how people 
felt when confronted by cybersecurity fear appeals, their 
responses are shown in Table 1. When asked to choose 
only one response, their responses are depicted in Fig. 5 
in the Appendix. The general responses are negative, peo-
ple mostly indicating uneasiness and dislike for this kind 
of message. They did not find these messages empower-
ing, even though they are clearly intended as such by their 
deployers. This introduces a new potential detriment: PD11 
Making people feel uneasy about cybersecurity and causing 
negative emotions.
RQ3 findings
When asked how they felt about the questions shown in 
Fig. 4 (in Appendix), the number of people choosing the 
response is shown next to the question. Once again, respond-
ents indicated their disapproval and their reservations about 
the use of cybersecurity fear appeals.
Summary
Table 2 summarizes this discussion, showing which poten-
tial detriments were highlighted by each stakeholder group. 
These feed into the final section where we derive the over-
arching ethical principles to inform cybersecurity fear 
appeals.
Table 1  How respondents felt when shown a cybersecurity fear 
appeal (multiple responses permitted)
Response % Response %
Uneasy 43.3 Necessary 20.8
Dislike 41.3 Motivating 18.5
Informative 33.3 Retreat 5.8
Uncertain 24.8 Empowering 5.5
Indifferent 23.8
Table 2  Cybersecurity fear appeal detriments mentioned by the different stakeholders (Res = Researcher; Org = Organization; Ind = Individual)
Res Org Ind
PD1 Alienation of non-cyber employees •
PD2 Paralyzing cybersecurity-related decision making •
PD3 Succeeding with cybersecurity skilled members of society, and putting a disproportional burden on 
their shoulders
•
PD4 Risks being over inflated or untruthful, to maximize motivation to take cybersecurity actions • •
PD5 Giving too little added security in return for experienced fear • •
PD6 People being unable to take cybersecurity actions to assuage the triggered fear • • •
PD7 People being treated as a means to an end, without full information • •
PD8 Employees becoming disgruntled •
PD9 Contributing towards overall fear fatigue •
PD10 Creating cybersecurity-related anxiety and paranoia •
PD11 Making people feel uneasy about cybersecurity and causing negative emotions •
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Phase 3: Deriving ethical principles (Ei)
Table 3 uses the insights gathered from the consultation 
process to develop the Effects-Reasoning Matrix (ERM) 
(Duke et al. 1993).
Ethical considerations
A number of ethical requirements emerged from the previ-
ous discussion. We will discuss each of these, then pro-
vide a brief precis of how a snapshot of cybersecurity fear 
appeal studies have dealt with this ethical consideration. 
We have not attempted to include each and every study, 
but rather to use a representative sample of cybersecurity 
research that has employed fear appeals. The chosen stud-
ies were found by using the search terms “fear appeal” 
and “security” to provide as broad of an initial search 
criteria as possible, given the varying terms used (e.g., 
cybersecurity, information security, information systems 
security, etc.). The initial search was performed using the 
Business Source Complete research database. Seventeen 
studies were identified through this search with six not 
being related to cybersecurity. Two other studies that 
were related to cybersecurity were not included; one was 
a review article without a fear appeal deployment, while 
the other one was not focused on cybersecurity, but rather 
the economic ramifications of a massive cyber attack. We 
then used the Academic Search Complete database and 
found one additional study. Next, we performed the same 
search using Google Scholar and examined the first 20 
results to determine if we were missing a relevant study 
based on the aforementioned search terms and the rank-
ing algorithm deployed by Google. Four additional studies 
were identified. Finally, we examined the references of 
the included studies to this point (i.e., 14) to determine if 
there were any significant studies that we were missing. A 
study was considered significant at this stage if it met the 
previously noted inclusion criteria and had 100 or more 
citations per Google Scholar. We found three additional 
studies through this technique. The final number of studies 
included was 17.
Our final list of studies used fear appeals for: anti-mal-
ware software installation (Boss et al. 2015), compliance 
with security policies (Johnston et al. 2015; Herath and 
Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Mwagwabi et al. 
2018; Wall and Warkentin 2019; Du et al. 2013), encour-
aging backups (Boss et al. 2015; Crossler 2010), engen-
dering organizational commitment (Posey et al. 2015), 
improving organizational security (Warkentin et al. 2016), 
phish detection (Jansen and van Schaik 2019), warnings 
about ransomware (Marett et al. 2019), using a PIN on 
their mobile phones (Albayram et al. 2017), improving 
online security behavior (van Bavel et al. 2019), discour-
aging password reuse (Jenkins et al. 2014), improving 
employee security behavior (Johnston et al. 2019), and 
improving password selection (Vance et al. 2013).
E1: Obtain IRB approval
The researcher should request and obtain approval from 
their organization’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) or 
equivalent body. While this is an umbrella concept, it can 
be considered specifically to address potential detriments 
PD2, PD3, PD6, PD9 and PD10.
Since cybersecurity fear appeal research inherently 
involves human participation, it is generally a legal or insti-
tutional requirement (or both) for the principal investigator 
to have sought and received approval prior to the involve-
ment of human participants in any study. This type of activ-
ity involving ethics has been termed “procedural ethics” by 
some (Guillemin and Gillam 2004). In its most basic form, 
it reassures the reviewing body that the researcher can be 
trusted to perform the research ethically with high regard 
for participants.
IRBs usually require researchers to ensure that people 
understand the purpose of the fear appeal and the concomi-
tant risks, and ensure that participants provide informed con-
sent before participation (Anabo et al. 2019). Effectively, it 
ensures that participants retain the right to self-determina-
tion and autonomy (Miller and Boulton 2007). In practice, 
this generally involves giving the participant a written state-
ment explaining the study, its purpose, expected duration, 
confidentiality and limits, contact information if questions 
or concerns should arise, compensation that will be pro-
vided, potential risks, how these risks relate to those com-
monly encountered in everyday life, the potential benefits of 
the study, and reassures the participant that they can cease 
involvement in the research at any time, and for any rea-
son (American Psychological Association 2016). Informed 
consent may be waived in some cases, e.g., for anonymous 
surveys or naturalistic observations (American Psychologi-
cal Association 2016).
Cybersecurity fear appeal studies In the cybersecurity 
fear appeal studies we examined,
it was more of an exception than a rule for a study to 
indicate that informed consent was obtained from research 
participants, with only the following doing so (Boss et al. 
2015; Marett et al. 2019; Vance et al. 2013; van Bavel et al. 
2019). However, the description of the methods employed 
strongly suggested that consent was obtained. For example, 
Herath and Rao (2009) detailed the steps taken to ensure 
their participants felt comfortable regarding their anonymity, 
such as using codes and noting that the data collected was 
for research purposes only (Herath and Rao 2009).
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Most institutions require this (Sullivan 2019) so that it 
is likely that all of these studies did go through the proper 
IRB process. Not reporting on IRB approval is not unique to 
cybersecurity (Myles and Tan 2003; Yank and Rennie 2002).
E2: Make cybersecurity benefits salient
It became apparent that there had to be a clear benefit to the 
cybersecurity fear appeal for people to believe that they were 
being treated fairly by targeting them with the appeal. This 
was a concern expressed by both cybersecurity deployers 
and recipients. Ensuring that we are not using people as a 
means to an end, and taking cognizance of their need for a 
benefit, addresses potential detriments PD3, PD5, PD7 and 
PD8.
It is the responsibility of the researcher to inform the 
participant of a cybersecurity fear appeal study’s risks and 
potential benefits; this practice has a long history across 
multiple disciplines (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). In 
essence, this addresses justice theory’s concept of fairness. 
The person being targeted by the cybersecurity fear appeal 
has to perceive the fairness of the appeal, and of the required 
cybersecurity-related recommended action. Perceptions of 
fairness may also lead to greater adherence to the recom-
mended action (Henle et al. 2009).
While this calculus subsumes an inherently utilitarian 
philosophical perspective (Buchanan and Ess 2008), the con-
sequentialist approach remains the primary means through 
which a determination is made on the ethical acceptability 
of a research study involving human participants (Haigh and 
Jones 2005). Part of this calculus should naturally consider 
the potential harm a participant may face without the mes-
saging received in a study involving an element of fear.
While this may simply be the opposite side of the same 
coin, a participant in such a study may not only receive some 
discernible benefit in terms of improved cybersecurity, but 
may also avoid a potential harm. For example, a cybersecu-
rity fear appeal study may focus on the dangers associated 
with ransomware and explain how this may be ameliorated 
by backing up all data. A participant that receives this mes-
saging may choose to follow the recommended action. How-
ever, if the individual did not participate in the cybersecu-
rity fear appeal study, including some of the psychological 
costs associated with fear induction, the consequences could 
be much worse. An individual could easily lose all of her 
important data; a result most would consider much worse 
than some momentary psychological costs associated with 
the feeling of fear.
Cybersecurity fear appeal studies It is possible that 
most (if not all) of the studies included in our analysis 
did consider how the costs of the study compared to the 
perceived benefits, but a discussion of these considerations 
was often not explicitly included in the papers. Given the 
prevalence of online data collection and the use of the 
Internet for cybersecurity fear appeal studies, additional 
considerations may need to inform practice.
E3: Deception must be justified
Some of our deployers considered deception acceptable, 
while others did not. Individuals also objected to decep-
tion and untruthfulness in cybersecurity fear appeals. This 
suggests the need for deception to be robustly justified 
before it is used in a cybersecurity fear appeal. Ensur-
ing truthfulness, unless deception is robustly justified, 
addresses potential detriments PD1, PD4, PD7 and PD10.
While some philosophical perspectives may not find 
the use of deception ethical in any context, such as Kan-
tian ethics, it is generally regarded as a necessary compo-
nent of a variety of types of research (Miller et al. 2005). 
Some fear appeal studies may constitute a straightforward 
cybersecurity fear appeal without the need for deception 
(e.g., Johnston et al. 2015), while other studies may use 
deception to provide a more realistic experimental sce-
nario (e.g., Boss et al. 2015). Although alternatives have 
been advanced, such as role playing (Holmes and Bennett 
1974), the use of deception remains an important research 
tool. Nonetheless, its use has waned in recent years in 
some disciplines, such as psychology, as methods, theory, 
and ethical standards have evolved (Nicks et al. 1997). 
When deception is used, additional justifications must be 
provided (American Psychological Association 2016).
Cybersecurity fear appeal studies Deception appears to 
have been used very rarely in the cybersecurity fear appeal 
studies we examined here with only one reporting its use 
(Boss et al. 2015). Even studies involving experimental 
manipulations, or those that attempted to elicit different 
levels of fear, did not report using deception. For those 
studies that did not explicitly state whether deception was 
used, it appears to be because deception was simply not 
involved in the study protocol rather than failing to indi-
cate one way or the other. Moreover, the lack of deception 
in cybersecurity fear appeal studies seems to suggest that 
they may not be a critical element in most contexts. In 
some type of experimental studies, whether field or labo-
ratory, it might not only make sense, but be necessary to 
employ some level of deception so that realistic results 
may be obtained (e.g., Boss et al. 2015). It is also possible 
that cybersecurity researchers may continue to seek other 
ways in which equivalent results may be obtained, similar 
to other disciplines (Nicks et al. 1997). This may not elim-
inate the use of deception, but may serve to minimize it.
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E4: Provide feasible recommended cybersecurity 
action
Both cybersecurity fear appeal deployers and targets 
mentioned that a recommended action ought be provided 
to ensure that people can assuage their fear (Renaud and 
Dupuis 2019).
The recommended action gives the participant a reason-
able cybersecurity action that can be taken, thereby mak-
ing it possible for the recipient to engage in danger control 
(Lawson et al. 2016; Leventhal 1970; Witte 1992). Ensuring 
that a feasible action is available addresses potential detri-
ment PD6.
A recommended cybersecurity action is more likely to be 
seen in experimental research involving a treatment of some 
kind since what one would generally test for is the degree to 
which the recommended action has been used (e.g., Davin-
son and Sillence 2010). From an ethical standpoint, a rec-
ommended cybersecurity action should be advised when an 
explicit fear appeal is used. In other words, if you are going 
to elicit fear then you should provide information on how to 
assuage that fear, some feasible cybersecurity action to take, 
as this is a major and essential component of a fear appeal 
(Mwagwabi et al. 2018).
A recommended action may be included as part of the 
fear appeal messaging only, and not included in messages 
delivered to the control group or separate treatment group. 
However, this may result in the control group (or another 
treatment group in the case of a modified classical design) 
not receiving information on the recommended action, 
which could well obfuscate the primary reason for differ-
ences in behaviors between experimental groups, not the 
influence of the fear itself. Given the central role a recom-
mended action may play in the development of adequate 
levels of self- and response-efficacy (Witte 1996), it is pos-
sible the lack of adoption is related to recipients not knowing 
about the recommended action, rather than the absence of 
fear. Considering the central role self-efficacy has had in 
behavioral outcomes in protection motivation theory studies 
(Floyd et al. 2000; Milne et al. 2000), it is important that this 
is taken into account.
The ethical concerns related to inducing fear may become 
a moot point if, in reality, it is information on the recom-
mended action that is effectuating a positive change and 
not the induction of fear itself. While it is unlikely to be 
attributable fully to one or the other, and may vary based on 
context, the level of ambiguity remains a concern (De Hoog 
et al. 2007, 2005). Thus, it is difficult to know, with any 
reasonable level of assurance, until studies begin consist-
ently empirically testing for this within the cybersecurity 
domain. However, there is ample evidence that suggests the 
recommended action component of a fear appeal is effec-
tive (Ruiter et al. 2014). Not controlling for the effect of the 
recommended action constitutes an important opportunity 
being missed, both from an ethical standpoint and more 
broadly speaking as well.
Cybersecurity fear appeal studies Most of the fear appeal 
studies we examined did include a recommended action 
(Boss et al. 2015; Johnston et al. 2015; Johnston and War-
kentin 2010; Jansen and van Schaik 2019; Albayram et al. 
2017; Marett et al. 2019; Mwagwabi et al. 2018; Jenkins 
et al. 2014; Wall and Warkentin 2019; Johnston et al. 2019; 
Du et al. 2013; van Bavel et al. 2019). Given the central 
importance of providing a recommended action in the wake 
of a fear appeal, this is encouraging. It is possible that the 
other studies did provide a recommended action, but did not 
explicitly report on it. In some disciplines a recommended 
action may be self-evident, such as anti-smoking campaigns. 
However, even then we see explicit recommended actions 
being provided to the individual (i.e., quitting smoking) 
(Leventhal and Watts 1966). Given the abstract nature of 
cybersecurity from the perspective of the target audience 
(West 2008), what may be self-evident to the researcher may 
not be entirely clear to the intended recipients.
E5: Calibrate during deployment
The experiences of one of the researchers and one of the 
CISOs with fear appeals that overstepped the mark, sug-
gests the need for calibration to take place, before and during 
deployment to monitor the success of the intervention and to 
uncover potential negative side effects. Calibration addresses 
potential detriments PD1 and PD4.
Because fear appeals aim to make people feel fearful, 
it is essential that the fear appeal deployer: (1) designs the 
cybersecurity fear appeal with great care, and, if the decision 
to deploy is made, (2) carefully monitors the deployment 
at regular intervals. This is even more important for cyber-
security appeals, than for fear appeals in more established 
domains, because the general population often do not have 
high levels of cybersecurity expertise and a poorly designed 
fear appeal could make them overly fearful.
In terms of design, many of our fear appeal researcher 
interviewees mentioned consulting with their peers when 
designing a fear appeal.
In terms of monitoring, it is advisable to measure levels 
of elicited fear, potential negative consequences, and feasi-
bility of the recommended action for the targeted recipients 
(Renaud and Dupuis 2019). The option to call a halt to the 
experiment/deployment should always be on the table.
Calibration ought to be carried out in the spirit of Kant’s 
golden rule, as argued by one of our interviewees: I gener-
ally like to view everything I do from the perspective of the 
golden rule, which says do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you so when you put yourself in that perspec-
tive of your participants.
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Cybersecurity fear appeal studies Based on our inter-
views with researchers, calibration from an ethics standpoint 
may be done in some contexts in cybersecurity fear appeal 
studies. However, it is not something commonly reported on 
in the studies we examined. The informal discussions that 
may take place at conferences and between faculty and stu-
dents are important, but do not replace results that could be 
obtained from a more formalized calibration process. Nor-
mative concepts, such as ethics, may benefit from a calibra-
tion process (Uviller 2000) and should be considered and 
reported on in all fear appeal studies, and this includes those 
used in the cybersecurity domain.
E6: Debrief at conclusion of experiment
A number of researchers highlighted the need for cybersecu-
rity fear appeal recipients to be debriefed at the conclusion 
of an experiment. Giving people due respect by debriefing 
them addresses potential detriments PD1 and PD7.
Debriefing involves a communication with the partici-
pants at the conclusion of a research study, with information 
generally provided about the true nature of the study (Smith 
and Richardson 1983).
The debrief serves multiple purposes, including provid-
ing a venue for participants who may have felt harmed in 
some way to discuss the matter with the researcher. In these 
particular cases, debriefing has been found to be a powerful 
tool in mitigating the harm that may unintentionally have 
been caused (Smith and Richardson 1983).
In some studies, a formal debriefing may not be practical, 
such as a large-scale survey with anonymous participants. 
However, even in these kinds of studies, it is possible to 
provide participants with the option of being able to read 
the resulting research report (e.g., website address that they 
may check at a later date).
While debriefing is important, in some instances it may 
be omitted if there are scientific merits to doing so and the 
potential risks to the participants are minimal (American 
Psychological Association 2016).
Cybersecurity fear appeal studies Debriefing is not 
reported in most of the cybersecurity fear appeal studies we 
analyzed, the exception being (Boss et al. 2015). This may 
be partly due to the changing nature of research in which a 
large proportion of studies are conducted online rather than 
in-person (Kraut et al. 2004). However, even when this is the 
case, debriefing of some type should still occur unless there 
are clear justifications for its omission.
Summary
Figure 3 depicts the ethical principles and Table 4 shows 
how these ethical principles address the perceived detri-
ments that emerged from our consultation.
Reflection
In experimenting with fear appeals in cybersecurity, 
researchers seek to determine whether it is possible to trans-
fer an intervention that has, up to now, performed with effi-
cacy in the safety context (e.g. health (Witte et al. 2001) and 
personal care (Bartikowski et al. 2019)) to the cybersecurity 
context (something that can harm your devices and might 
harm you in a very small percentage of cases). The kinds 
of system where a lack of cybersecurity can cause physi-
cal harm are referred to as “cyber-physical” systems [110]. 
Yet, it must be acknowledged that a failure of cybersecurity 
could also lead to psychological harm, especially when fear 
appeals are deployed. This might be the case when the per-
son being targeted is already anxious about other things, or 
does not feel competent to take the recommended action. 
This was the rationale for the research reported in this paper.
In this paper, we report on how we derived a set of cyber-
security-specific ethical principles to inform the deployment 
of cybersecurity fear appeals.
We commenced with an overview of the components 
of fear appeals (FAi), and a discussion of the three ethical 
theories that could be used to contemplate the impacts of 
their deployment. We then interviewed cybersecurity fear 
appeal deployers and recipients to derive a set of potential 
detriments related to their deployment, specifically in the 
cybersecurity domain (PDi).
Our investigation suggests that cybersecurity fear appeals 
ought to be used with caution. To exercise such caution, we 
ought first to ensure that the
cybersecurity ethical principles we derived inform the 
design and deployment of cybersecurity fear appeals. Kant’s 
Golden Rule ought to be our guide when deciding on how 
Fig. 3  Cybersecurity fear appeal ethical principles for informing their 
design and deployment
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much fear to elicit, while Utilitarianism ought to require 
us to assure, by constant monitoring during the course of 
the deployment, that the cybersecurity fear appeal is indeed 
delivering value. Finally, justice theory considerations high-
light the need for participants to feel that they are being 
treated fairly. It is not enough for us, as researchers, to be 
able to gain something from the study: participants should 
be happy to give us the right to target them with cybersecu-
rity fear appeals.
Limitations
The number of cybersecurity fear appeal researchers we 
interviewed is small. A larger number of interviewees would 
give a more nuanced insight into their motivations and 
understandings of the ethical implications of fear appeals. 
The number of CISOs, too, was relatively small. Widening 
the sample would be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Therefore, generalizability is inherently limited in this 
respect. While the insight gained from both sets of research 
participants varied within the groups and between them, 
there may be other important insights that could be gained 
from other CISOs and researchers whose views were not 
represented here. Likewise, the large-scale survey consisted 
of participants from the United States only. To the extent that 
workers on a crowdsourcing platform are generalizable to 
the population, this population may be limited to people in 
the United States, given varying cultural norms and customs.
Common method bias is another possible limitation. 
While common method bias is less likely to be an issue 
with the data collected on the CISOs and researchers, it 
can be an issue for the recipients of fear appeals given that 
a single quantitative methodology was used in a large-
scale survey (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Malhotra et al. 2006). 
However, this was mitigated in part by the use of a partici-
pant pool that is able to remain anonymous to the research 
team; this reduces the likelihood of satificing. Addition-
ally, quality control (i.e., attention check) questions were 
embedded throughout the survey, as well as non-Likert 
questions. All of this helps reduce the likelihood that 
common method bias had a significant role in the results 
obtained and conclusions made thereof (MacKenzie and 
Podsakoff 2012).
Conclusion
Cybersecurity researchers carry out research into the use of 
cybersecurity fear appeals to encourage people to engage 
in precautionary behaviors or to cease insecure behaviors. 
CISOs sometimes deploy such appeals in their organiza-
tions. In this paper, we explored the ethical issues related to 
the deployment of fear appeals in the cybersecurity context. 
By consulting cybersecurity fear appeal deployers and tar-
gets we were able to derive a set of six cybersecurity-specific 
Table 4  Mapping the ethical principles (Ei) to the perceived detriments (PDi - Table 2) and Fear Appeal Components: FT fear trigger (FA1), RE 
response efficacy (FA2), RA recommended action (FA3), SE self-efficacy (FA4) (Section FA4)




E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
PD1 Alienation of employees • • •
PD2 Paralyzing cybersecurity-related decision making •
PD3 Succeeding with cybersecurity skilled members of society, and putting a 
disproportional burden on their shoulders
• •
PD4 Risks being over inflated or untruthful, to maximize motivation to take 
cybersecurity actions
• •
PD5 Giving too little added security in return for experienced fear •
PD6 People, being unable to take cybersecurity actions to assuage the fear • •
PD7 People, being treated as a means to an end, without full information • • •
PD8 Employees becoming disgruntled •
PD9 Contributing towards overall fear fatigue •
PD10 Creating cybersecurity-related anxiety and paranoia • •
PD11 Making people feel uneasy about cybersecurity and causing negative 
emotions
•
Fear Appeal Components All RE FT RA FT SE FT
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ethical principles which could guide deployment of such 
appeals. Our purpose, in writing this paper, is to launch a 
wider discourse into the ethics related to the deployment of 
fear appeals in the cybersecurity domain.
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Appendix A: Figures
See Figs. 4 and 5.
Fig. 4  Percentage of respond-
ents who thought the statement 
applied to the use of cyberse-
curity fear appeals (multiple 
choices permitted)
Fig. 5  When asked to choose only one response to the use of cyberse-
curity fear appeals
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Appendix B: Interview questions 
for researchers
(1) In your opinion, what are the primary ethical considera-
tions that a fear researcher should be concerned about?
(2) How do you balance these concerns with the benefits 
you believe derive from the use of fear appeals?
(3) How do ethical concerns influence the design of fear 
appeals?
(4) How do ethical concerns influence the deployment of 
fear appeals?
(5) How do you think fear appeal researchers could 
improve their consideration of ethical concerns of the 
use of fear appeals in information security?
Appendix C: Survey questions for CISOs
 (1) What types of techniques do you deploy in your capac-
ity as CISO: (check as many as you like: awareness 
campaigns; skill development and training; rewards; 
scary messages; monitoring and reporting to manag-
ers; games; peer support; maintain an information 
security knowledge repository. [order randomized]
 (2) For each of the ones you checked, can you say how 
effective they are on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very effective).
   A fear appeal is a message that attempts to persuade 
people to behave securely by scaring them, either by 
telling them about the consequences of being hacked, 
or by threatening sanctions within the organization.
 (3) In your opinion, are there any ethical considerations 
that a CISO should be concerned about when using a 
fear appeal in their organization?
 (4) In your opinion, are there any benefits to be gained 
from using a fear appeal in your organization?
 (5) Do you believe that you can balance the ethical con-
cerns with the benefits you can derive from the use of 
fear appeals? 
(a) for what particular behaviors would a fear appeal 
be your first option: phishing; locking computer; 
not plugging in foreign USBs; strong passwords; 
adopting 2FA. [order randomized]
 (6) Do ethical concerns influence whether you decide to 
use a fear appeal or not in your organization?
 (7) Who would have to approve the use of a fear appeal 
in your organization?
 (8) If you’ve used a fear appeal in the past: tell us about 
it; how did you determine whether it was effective or 
not?; did you continue or discontinue using it?
 (9) any other thoughts about fear appeals would be wel-
comed.
 (10) Demographics: size of organization, and how long 
they have been a CISO
Survey questions for recipients
(1) Demographics
(2) Show an image of a cybersecurity fear appeal. 
(3) Which of the words below describe how you FEEL 
about these kinds of messages, ones that try to scare 
you into taking an action? (choose all that apply): ‘Dis-
like’; ‘Informative’; ‘Uneasy’; ‘Empowering’; ‘Moti-
vating’; ‘Uncertain’; ‘Necessary’; ‘Retreat’; ‘Indiffer-
ent’. [order randomized]
(4) With the same words as the previous question: Which 
of the words below BEST describes how you FEEL 
about these kinds of messages, ones that try to scare 
you into taking an action? (select your top one only)
(5) The message we show above attempts to make people 
feel afraid. Do you approve of the use of fear in cyber-
security messages? ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘it depends’ (please 
explain)
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(6) Which of the options below describe what you THINK 
about these kinds of messages, ones that try to scare 
people into taking an action? (choose all that apply): 
“They simply don’t work”; “It is ethical to scare some-
one if it helps them”; “It is okay to exaggerate the threat 
if it means people will take action”; “It is NOT okay to 
exaggerate the threat even if it means people will take 
action”; “It is NOT ethical to scare someone into doing 
something”; “ They generally aren’t that scary”; “Too 
many of these kinds of messages.” [order randomized]
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